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Shame on You: 








Aristotle presents shame as a non-virtue, but through a careful analysis of his 
definition and discussion of shame the reader can conclude that there is an 
appropriate type of shame; a prospective as opposed to retrospective feeling of 
shame. This prospective shame one of the best ways a well-bred youth can be led 
to the acquisition of virtuous character. This paper will explore Aristotle’s 
understanding of shame as explained in both the Nicomachean Ethics and in his 
broader corpus, and will examine who can possess shame, how it can be used to 
teach virtue, and the impact of polis upon this process. 
 
 
“Whilst shame keeps its watch, virtue is not wholly extinguished in the heart[.]” 
EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France 
 
“Where there is yet shame, there may in time be virtue.”  





As the above epigraphs note, there is a direct and long recognized connection between virtue and 
shame.1 While the paradoxical nature of these concepts have led to an increasing de-emphasis of 
this connection, eighteenth-century  English moral writers recognize that an individual’s 
possession of a sense of shame presupposes that there is a standard of acceptable action that the 
community holds to be honorable and consequently a standard of dishonorable action. These 
epigraphs indicate that the existence of shame presupposes that there is a standard of noble action 
and that shame is a means by which virtue can be cultivated in the community. These views are 
rightly reminiscent of teaching in Nicomachean Ethics. The Aristotelian presentation of shame is 
complex; for Aristotle clearly presents shame (aidos) as similar to a virtue, but closer to a feeling 
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than an active state, and thus it is a non-virtue (NE 1108a25). Despite the modern de-emphasis of 
the relation of shame and virtue, this clear label, scholars have argued that the ancient Greeks 
generally,2 and Aristotle specifically3 present a link between this non-virtue and the moral virtues.  
Central to understanding the particular Aristotelian moral virtues is the question of how an 
individual obtains them. Burnyeat correctly notes that the path to moral virtue is not merely an 
individualistic path, but where habituation in virtuous action is provided by external guidance, 
either family or community, to establish a “good upbringing.”4 For Aristotle the external guidance 
must be by a specific type of man, the spudios or prudent man, who is able to determine the mean 
in relation to the individual (1107a1). It is only through the applied pressure from external guidance 
that someone can walk the path to internalize the virtues as an active condition. The process by 
which external guidance leads to internalization has been widely discussed among various 
scholars.  
Some interpreters argue that the appropriate use of pleasure is the primary means for guidance 
down the path of virtue.5 Aristotle notes that the life which defines happiness as pleasure is a life 
“that belongs to fatted cattle” (1095b20). And while Aristotle shows that the life of virtue is 
“concerned with pleasures and pains” (1104b15) it appear that virtue’s connection with pleasure 
may only be tenuous and given to provide the audience a reason to listen to the whole treatise. 
While it is true that Aristotle recognizes that something which may not be pleasant of itself or by 
its nature, but through habituation, becomes performed with pleasure (Rhetoric 1369b15–19 and 
1179b35), such position seemingly indicates that the item becoming habit is what makes it 
pleasurable, not that seeking pleasure established the habit. Further, the utilization of this position 
is exacerbated because, as Aristotle notes, “in most people, a distortion seems to come about by 
the action of pleasure” (1113b1).6 It is critical to realize that those who have not yet obtained virtue 
have faulty views of pleasure (1099a6) which is immensely difficult to overcome (1105a8). For 
Aristotle pleasure seems more likely to lead those who do not yet have virtue astray than to assist 
them in discovering and becoming virtuous (1109a14–17; see also 1104b9–11). It would be unwise 
to utilize a method to purportedly produce virtue which when practically applied will lead most 
people away from, rather than towards, virtue.  
The difficulty in this interpretation has led other scholars to argue that the path to virtue is not 
guided by pleasure, but pain.7 Yet, it is not any type of pain that leads to virtue; rather, it is a pain 
which is directly connected with a moral component. For Aristotle, the non-virtue of shame is 
precisely this painful guide, for “Let shame be understood as a certain pain or agitation over bad 
deeds” (1383b15). Shame is a critical passion in Aristotelian rhetoric, for it is tied directly to the 
individual and social conception of the kalon or noble. 
This paper, through a careful analysis of Aristotle’s discussion of shame, argues that the best 
method to guide well-bred youths, or gentlemen, to the point where they acquire a virtuous 
character is through the appropriate use of prospective shame. This paper will explore Aristotle’s 
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understanding of shame as explained in both the Nicomachean Ethics and in his broader corpus, 
and will examine who can possess shame, how it can be used to teach virtue, and the impact of 
polis upon this process. 
1. Shame as a Semi-Virtue 
 
Aristotle’s first mention of shame in Nicomachean Ethics arises in the concluding remarks of his 
brief introduction of the moral virtues. He states that individuals who possesses a sense of shame 
are praised because shame is a “mean condition […] involving the feelings” (1108a32). While this 
introduction is brief, it is indicative of the paradoxical nature of shame. In establishing shame as a 
feeling (pathos), Aristotle removes it from the realm of active condition (hexis) (1105b20) and 
places it in the lower part of the soul, distinct from true virtue (1107a1). Later, Aristotle explicates 
that “it is not appropriate to speak about a sense of shame as if it were a virtue, for it seems more 
like a feeling than an active condition” (1128b10). It is important to notice that the subsequent 
discussion hedges, for shame “seems” to be “more” like a feeling. Aristotle recognizes that while 
shame is a feeling, it plays a crucial role as a bridge between pathos and hexis, and thus there is an 
ambiguity to its precise role.  
Shame appears ambiguous because it shares a critical characteristic with virtue because it is a 
“mean condition” (1108b32). It is in this subtle similarity that the reader can see Aristotle’s 
foreshadowing a more complete understanding of the connection between shame and virtue 
presented later in Nicomachean Ethics. Presenting shame as a mean not only indicates it has an 
excess and deficiency, but primarily it is indicative that there is an appropriate feeling of shame. 
Subsequent statements help recognize precisely what that mean state of shame is, for it arises in 
“a certain kind of fear of a bad reputation” (1128b12). While this definition does provide some 
new information, i.e., that shame is related to fear and one’s reputation which is derived from the 
opinion of others, this definition is still not Aristotle’s fullest explanation of shame. For the most 
complete definition, the reader must turn to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where in a discussion of the 
emotions he devotes a chapter to shame. In the Rhetoric Aristotle defines shame as “a certain pain 
or agitation over bad deeds, present, past, or future that appear to bring one into disrepute” 
(1383b15). This description of shame is both consistent with and more complete than his 
discussion in Nicomachean Ethics.  
This definition exhibits three major components which are important to highlight in order to 
understand Aristotelian shame. The first is that shame is a pain or disturbance. While the definition 
given in Nicomachean Ethics (1128b12) presents shame as a fear, the Rhetoric definition 
emphasizes that that fear is related to pain. Shame is a mean (1108a32) of the appropriate feeling 
of pain.8 Second, Aristotle notes precisely what type of pain shame deals with: “evils that appear 
to pertain to disrepute” (1383b20). In this sense, shame is very much a socio-psychological feeling, 
for the pain happens not to one’s physical body, but to one’s standing in the eyes of others. Shame 
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is a feeling derived from man’s political nature (1253a2) and affects his standing in the eyes of 
others. This change in others’ opinion of the actor arises from two sources: either by engaging in 
evil acts of commission or by failing to do the virtuous acts through omission. But, the actual 
change in opinion can only happen after the ignoble act is done. This then presents the third, and 
perhaps oddest component of the definition, the time in which shame is felt. Shame is not 
exclusively an emotion arising after the fact; rather, Aristotle clearly notes that someone can feel 
shame immediately, retrospectively, or prospectively. Given that the previous part of the definition 
would seem to indicate merely a post-hoc feeling of shame, it is necessary to realize that the 
prospective component of feeling shame that is most crucial to a moral education. 
This is perhaps the most critical point in understanding Aristotle’s view of shame, for the path 
to virtue is one in which the individual is guided through external constraints to internalize the 
appropriate active states of virtue. Shame itself moves through these steps. Retrospective shame is 
purely derived from external constraints; it is imposed upon the individual by other members of 
the polis (1383b16; see also 1128b12). In this case the individual had no hesitation in committing 
the ignoble act or omitting the virtuous one. Yet, the feeling of shame now teaches the individual 
that the future situations which involve the same action will lead to the same form of disrepute. 
Perhaps the individual does not keep that at the forefront of his mind, and in a similar situation 
again does a similar act, but now, even before the event is made aware publically, the individual 
feels shame. This is derived from previous experience and knowledge of societal norms.9 Yet, the 
most effective type of shame for the guiding of action is the type that occurs before the action 
rather than after.  
It is this prospective characteristic of shame that is perhaps the most important because it is 
rooted in knowledge of what is honorable and dishonorable, as well as the saliency of that 
knowledge to an as yet undone act. It is, if not prudence, the application of wise foresight. The 
individual knows what is right, knows that what is right is important to an upcoming action, and 
can rightly judge the wider impact of the action upon members of society. This distinction between 
post-hoc feelings of shame and prospective feelings of shame are central to understanding 
Aristotle’s use of, and distinction between, the two Greek words translated as “shame” in the 
Nicomachean Ethics: aidos and aischune. 
 
2. Aidos and Aischune 
 
In his most lengthy discussion of shame in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses both terms, though 
the dominant word throughout the whole work is aidos. In the Rhetoric he uses the more prosaic 
word aischune.10 In order to understand these words, it is worthwhile to examine Aristotle’s 
discussion in 1128b10–35 with the transliteration of the Greek distinction between his use of the 
5  Higgins 
 
two terms. Cairns’s translation, which preserves the distinction between the Greek words, is most 
helpful:11 
 
It is wrong to speak of aidos as virtue; it is more like a feeling than an active 
condition. It is defined, at any rate, as a sort of fear of ill-repute, and its effects are 
similar to those who fear danger; for those who are hoi aischunomenoi [ashamed] 
go red, and those who fear death turn pale. Both, then, appear to be in a way 
somatic, which seems to be a feature of a feeling rather than of an active condition. 
The feeling, moreover, is not suitable for every age-group, but for youth. For we 
think that people of that age should be aidemon [sense of shame], because, since 
they live by their emotions, they often err, but are prevented by aidos [shame]. And 
we praise young men who are aidemon [display shame], but no one would say 
appreciatively of an older man that he is aischuntelos [full of shame]; for we think 
that he should do nothing that is attended by aischune [shame]. For aischune 
[shame] is not a mark of a decent man, since it occurs at base actions—such things 
are not to be done. Whether some actions are really aischra [shameful] and others 
only in belief does not matter; neither sort should be done, so that one should not 
feel aischune [shame]. It is the mark of a base person to be such as to do something 
aischron [shameful]—to be so disposed as to be aischunesthai [shameful] were one 
to do some such thing, and to consider oneself decent on this account, would be 
absurd; for aidos [shame] occurs at voluntary actions, but the decent man will never 
willingly commit base acts. Aidos [shame] would be a decent thing on a hypothesis: 
if he were to do it, he would be aischunesthai [shameful]; but this does not apply 
to the virtues. For if anaishuntia [shamelessness] and not feeling aidos [shame] at 
the prospect of doing what is aischron [shameful] are base, this does not mean that 
to feel aischune [shame] when one does such things is decent.12 
 
As this passage elucidates, and as scholars have noted, the words aidos and aischune “are by no 
means entirely synonymous.”13 Yet, if one is to understand the role of shame in the scheme of 
Aristotle’s ethics, one must closely disentangle the meaning between these terms. 
Aristotle states that “shame [aishcune] does not belong to decent people, if it comes about for 
base acts” (1128b23), yet later writes that “a sense of shame [aidos] could be something decent 
only hypothetically” (1128b30). If one were to read those statements in English, seeing no 
difference in the term “shame,” one might think Aristotle presents a contradiction in his work. 
However, through a careful reading one can glean insight into the distinction between aischune 
and aidos, and can more precisely understand what Aristotle teaches about shame. The difference 
in these terms is perhaps made most clear when Aristotle says “aidos could be something decent 
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only hypothetically, since if one were to do those things, one would be aischunesthai” (1128b29). 
Since both words are used in one sentence, an examination of their meanings is necessary. While 
some readers may assume that Aristotle uses these words synonymously, and exchanges the use 
of one for the other in this discussion, a careful examination will show that Aristotle clearly 
attempts to distinguish them in the reader’s understanding. In this sentence Aristotle uses a 
conditional “if/then” clause. If someone were to engage in an action that is base, that actor would 
feel aischunesthai, or shameful. Such linguistic construction indicates that the word aischune is 
related to the consequence of acting in a base way, or specifically the retrospective feeling of 
shame within the Nicomachean Ethics. It must be remembered that the definition of shame 
provided in the Rhetoric, which uses the term aischune, encompasses the feeling of shame both 
before and after the commission or omission of human action which would be deemed base. Thus, 
it would seem that in Aristotle’s corpus the term aischune refers to the full and broadest category 
of shame, representing any and all forms of shame. Within the Nicomachean Ethics particularly, 
Aristotle uses this broad form to indicate the retrospective feeling of shame which arises after the 
action. Such interpretation is echoed by others, for Cairns notes that “in the present passage 
(1158b10–35) aischune is used in an exclusively retrospective sense.”14  
Aristotle later states that “for shamelessness and not feeling shame [aidos] at the prospect of 
doing what is shameful [aischron] are base” (1128b33). This indicates that the deficiency of shame 
has two forms. The first is not feeling aidos at the prospect of doing a shameful act. The second is 
not feeling shame as a consequence of that act. This distinction also plays into the important 
understanding of aidos, for here Aristotle states clearly that aidos is related to “the prospect of 
doing what is shameful.”15 Since we know that Aristotle links aidos to decency in thought or 
theory, one should realize that the emphasis on feeling aidos is in its future understanding of action. 
This indicates that aidos arises in the mind as one contemplates the consequences of future action, 
and if that future action is deemed to be shameful, i.e, aischune, and therefore someone feels shame 
at that outcome, he expresses aidos.16 Thus, aidos is most closely associated with the appropriate 
mean feeling of dishonor, which is why when discussing the mean of shame, Aristotle uses the 
word aidos (1108a33 and1221a1).  
 
3. Who Feels Shame 
 
In addressing the issue of who feels shame, Aristotle argues that the feeling of aidos is “not fitting 
for every time of life, but only in the young” and aischune is never praised when it is felt among 
the old (1128b18–21). It is important to note that the creation of a distinction between the age 
groups of those who feel shame also distinguishes between the types of shame. The aged should 
never feel aischune, the consequence of committing base actions, because they are less likely to 
follow their feelings and are expected to know what is shameful and thus avoid it. On the other 
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hand, it is appropriate for the youth to feel prospective shame, because they are, or should be, in 
the process of learning and developing the virtues.17 Similarly, training wheels are appropriate for 
a child’s bike, but if an adult were to ride a bike with training wheels, it would be inappropriate. 
The dominance of shame in the action of a youth arises because “they live by feeling, they err in 
many ways, but are held back by shame [aidos]” (1128b20). It is important to note that Aristotle 
recognizes that while in the youth the feelings rule, they are prevented from acting basely, or failing 
to act honorably, through shame.  
Aristotle indicates that youth do feel shame (aidos) and this is good, because it will train them 
in the habits that lead to virtue. Aristotle’s discussion of shame recognizes that shame must become 
a habituated action, for he distinguishes it from “self-restraint [which] is not a virtue either” 
(1128b35). Self-restraint, or incontinence, is that “each temptation requires a new effort of 
resistance.”18 By creating this distinction, Aristotle exhibits that shame is not a feeling that needs 
to arise on each individual action and necessitates that each action be reassessed as to whether it 
should be done; rather, a sense of aidos infects one’s outlook and begins the habituation towards 
virtue. It causes one to cease to be tempted to do the base act, and provides the guide to assess a 
type of action as shameful. Thus, as long as the youth have aidos and assess actions as base, they 
will not act ignobly. 
 
4. How Shame Guides 
 
This understanding of aidos plays a critical component in understanding the role of shame in 
teaching and molding citizens. The ability to mold citizens, particularly the youth, towards virtue 
is only possible if a sense of shame prevents a base action from occurring. In Aristotle’s discussion 
in the Rhetoric, he notes that the proper type of shame is “an imagination connected with disrepute, 
and felt for its own sake and not for its consequences” (1384a14). By denoting the proper sense of 
shame as an imagination, Aristotle argues that it is something that someone foresees in his or her 
mind to be in the future and is the result of a possible, but not yet occurring action. Thus, the proper 
feeling of shame exists before the occurrence of the shameful action ever becomes a physical 
reality. Yet one must also understand that shame does not teach him or her that an action is wrong; 
it must already be recognized that the act is wrong in order to feel shame. As Aristotle states, “so 
it is necessary for a character to be present in advance that is in some way appropriate for virtue, 
loving what is beautiful and scorning what is shameful” (1179b30). It is important to understand 
that Aristotle intends the audience of this discourse to be those gentlemen who, as Tessitore states, 
are “characterized by an attraction to goodness.”19 As Aristotle indicates, once someone knows 
and loves what is beautiful, he will have the desire to follow it. Thus, through seeing the beautiful, 
he will scorn what is shameful and it is this person who will be more likely to develop the habits 
of virtue through appropriately knowing the prospective feeling of shame and seek to act as the 
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prudent man would. Shame, then, is the guide to actions of virtue to those who know and desire 
the beautiful but are not yet possessing the character to be truly virtuous.  
However, for shame to actually produce virtue, it must guide individual actions so that it will 
produce a truly virtuous character. While it is possible for someone who obeys a proper sense of 
shame to act as a virtuous man would, this does not mean that that person is truly virtuous. Sachs 
notes “A mere habit of acting contrary to our inclinations cannot be a virtue.”20 Aristotle argues 
that for someone to act truly virtuously, he must do the proper action through a virtuous character. 
Knowing that shame is not a virtue, the reader can see how shame, in guiding individual acts, 
ensures that each action is done as a prudent man, or a man of virtue, would. This develops the 
character necessary for that person to become truly virtuous not only in appearance. As Aristotle 
states:  
 
In a word, active states [(hexis)] come into being from being at work [(energia)] in 
similar ways. Hence it is necessary to make our ways of being at work be of certain 
sorts, for our active states [(hexis)] follow in accordance with […] these. It makes 
no small difference, then, to be habituated in this way or in that straight from 
childhood, but an enormous difference, or rather all the difference. (1103b20–25)  
 
Aristotle indicates that true virtue can only be found in those who possess proper virtuous 
character, and such character can only arise through the habituation of constantly acting in the way 
a virtuous man would (1111b6). What is stunning about this prescription for virtue is that one must 
act virtuously before ever having a virtuous character. The proper virtuous education finds a way 
to habituate people in the proper action even before their character is formed. Further, it makes 
“all the difference” that this is begun in childhood (1103b25). It is from this description of the 
means to attain virtue that Aristotle presents one method to achieve such prescription. Since shame 
“is not fitting at every time of life, but only in the young,” one must teach them through establishing 
the “imagination connected with disrepute [making sure shame is] felt for its own sake and not for 
its consequences” (1128b12; 1384a20). This is why Aristotle notes that society “praises those 
among the young who display shame” because they are being moderate, temperate, and finding 
the mean in their actions (1128b20). Though the individual youth’s actions are not true virtue 
because they do not possesses the character of virtue, they are engaging in the habituation which 
is a necessary practice for them if they will possesses the character. As Sachs states, “the 
characteristic human way of being-at-work [(habit)] is the three fold activity of seeing an end, 
thinking about means to it, and choosing an action.”21 Shame directs and guides each of these three 
steps, and thus is fundamental to shaping habit. 
It is important to understand that though shame “seems more like a feeling than an active 
condition” (1128b10) it is closer to virtue than pure feelings. Aristotle places it and its excesses in 
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his list of virtues in the Eudemian Ethics (1220b37–1221a15). Further, when Aristotle is first 
introducing the virtues he notes that “while the sense of shame is not a virtue, the person with a 
sense of shame is also praised” (1108a32). Though shame is a feeling, it is an appropriate feeling, 
not one which is by definition excessive. Shame, like the virtues, is a mean between excesses 
(1108b32 and 1221a1). Also, just as virtues are “chosen for their own sake” (1105a35) so “Shame 
[…] is felt for its own sake and not for its consequences” (1384a14). In light of these similarities, 
one cannot view shame as just any other feeling, but rather it should be raised to the level of demi-
virtue. The characteristics it possesses resemble key characteristics of true virtue, and shame is 
also used to achieve true virtue. 
“Therefore, good judgment goes along with the way each one is educated” (1095a) and “some 
people think one becomes good by nature, others think it is by habit, and still others think it is by 
teaching” (1179b24). Aristotle notes that virtue cannot arise from nature (1103a20). This means 
only habit and teaching are able to guide people to become good, but as Aristotle notes teaching 
alone is not strong enough to teach virtue because it is “not powerful in all people” (1179b23–6). 
Thus, for teaching and arguments to actually educate the populace, “it is necessary for the soul of 
the listener to have been worked on beforehand by the means of habits” and through this necessary 
precondition virtue may arise (1179b26). Shame is one way that the habits can be instilled.  
This necessary presupposition leads Aristotle to recognize in his ethical discourse that the 
teaching of the role of shame as a guide or encourager of virtue cannot be for everyone because 
“discourses […] are unable to encourage most people toward what is beautiful and good” 
(1179b10). The reason most people cannot learn through discourses is that the impact of discourses 
requires the agreement upon the telos of the good and beautiful. In light of this, only those who 
begin with such an understanding of what is truly good and beautiful are able to be properly 
habituated through shame. As Aristotle says, “most people […] are naturally obedient not to 
respect but to fear, and refrain from base actions not on account of shame but on account of 
penalties” (1179b13). While the education through shame may not be able to be applied to the 
majority of citizens, it nonetheless can be taught publicly to all whose soul is furrowed.  
Some may argue whether virtue, which is supposed to be inherently linked to the pleasant, can 
be taught by shame, which is allied with feeling pain. In understanding this it is important to note 
that Aristotle does not seem to fully agree that all virtuous actions are always pleasant, for the 
height of a courage is death. Aristotle states, “hence courage too is painful, and justly praised, 
since it is more difficult to endure painful things than to refrain from pleasant ones” (1117a35). 
This is evidenced in other virtues, for temperate people feel pain “moderately” in avoiding certain 
pleasures of the body (1119a14), great-souled men are pained to hear of their debts (1124b13), and 
even in “the certain kind of virtue” (1155a1) of friendship, pain is involved when “seeing the friend 
pained at one’s own misfortunes is something painful” (1171b5). Thus, Aristotle states, “so being 
at work pleasantly is not present within all the virtues, except to the extent that one fixes one’s 
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attention upon the end” (1117b15). This important admission provides two key points in 
understanding how shame can promote the virtues. Since not all virtuous action is pleasant, actions 
which are the result of shame are not contradictory with virtue. Further, Aristotle clearly notes that 
education can be done through the proper setting of what is pleasant or painful before men. For 
“people educate the young steering them by means of pleasure and pain; and it seems that what is 
most conducive to virtue of character is to enjoy what one ought and hate what one ought” 
(1172a21). Most people choose things that are pleasant and avoid the painful. Thus it is the feelings 
which encourage people to enjoy what they should and hate what they should which have “in them 
a weight and a power that tend toward virtue and toward a happy life” (1172a22). The role of 
shame is the feeling which directs people to act, habitually, in a way that has them find pleasure 
in what they ought and pain in what they ought. 
 
5. The Polis as guiding Shame 
 
It is important to remember that Aristotle argues that shame only arises “before those whom one 
holds in regard” (1384a35). Those whom one should hold in regard include the prudent, older, 
educated men of society, and those who are constantly before one’s eyes (1384a29–35). Also, 
since man is a political animal who lives in society, and those societies are generally governed by 
the prudent, educated, and older citizens, one can conclude that the laws of society reflect the 
opinions of these men (1252a2; 1277b25; 1282b10). While the laws of a society are proclaimed 
and affect all, shame specifically and with better success will guide those whose souls are primed 
by a love of the beautiful. Just as the majority of the public can view beautiful pieces of art, it is 
those who know beauty and skill who can learn by studying the masters. This group of gentleman, 
through obedience to the laws, is able to cease to care for punishments because of penalties, and 
rather desires to be viewed honorably by the community. Thus, they are guided by shame and 
cease to live “in accord with feeling and following every impulse” (1095a8). Therefore, shame is 
capable of promoting and teaching men to act truly virtuously since “virtue is an active condition 
[(hexis)] that makes one apt at choosing […] [as] a person with practical judgment would 
determine it” (1107a3).  
It is this education towards virtue that lays the necessary foundation for the political. As 
Aristotle states at the conclusion of the Nicomachean Ethics, “So having made a beginning, let us 
discuss […] what sorts of things preserve and destroy cities” (1181b25 and 19). Specifically, 
Aristotle argues that since cities exist, not for the sake of mere living but for living well, “it is thus 
evident that virtue must be the care of every city” (1280b7). This statement argues that the political 
regime has not only the desire, but the necessity, of fomenting virtue through the appropriate 
enactment of laws. Clearly this is done through the laws of a city, for “What happens in cities gives 
evidence of this for Lawmakers make the citizens good by habituating them, and since this is the 
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intention of every lawmaker […] one regime differs from another in this respect as a good one 
from a worthless one” (1103b6–8). Thus, the political systems which succeed in habituating their 
citizens by establishing laws which will have the gentlemen of society refrain from base acts 
through the appropriate prospective shame, are to be recognized as better regimes than those who 
fail or do not try.  
Yet, if political regimes are judged through their success or failure in properly habituating and 
teaching their citizens virtue, one must recognize that the political community has the ability to 
impact virtue through deeming what actions are punished and shameful within that community. 
This indicates that the training necessary to produce virtue requires laws which guide people 
toward true virtue, for “It is difficult to hit upon a right training toward virtue from youth when 
one has not been brought up under laws of that sort” (1179b32). Aristotle indicates that variations 
in citizens’ virtue can arise because of the type of laws in these regimes: “the city’s being excellent 
is no longer the work of fortune but of knowledge and intentional choice” (1332a33). Further, “a 
city is excellent, at any rate, by its citizens’—those sharing in the regime—being excellent” 
(1332a34). This, then, is the role of the laws. The laws are the result of the intentional choice of 
the rulers and educate towards the regime’s understanding of the beautiful and ignoble (1287a25). 
One major way to do this is through the institution of punishments, which teach the citizenry which 
actions are to be regarded as shameful, and thus encourage the citizens towards virtue. 
The connection between shame and politics is also made clear in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, as he 
notes “the object of rhetoric is judgment” and “men give judgment on political issues” and 
“emotion[s] are those things by the alteration of which men differ with regard to those judgments 
which pain and pleasure accompany”(1378a25). One must remember the definition of shame given 
in the Rhetoric, that it is “a kind of pain or disturbance in connection with those evils that appear 
to pertain to disrepute, whether present, past, or future” (1383b20) The significance of this is that 
shame, though it is a mean condition of feelings (1108a32) is not about the feeling of pleasure, but 
is about the appropriate level of feeling pain. Since both politics and virtue deal with pleasures and 
pains (1105a10), the reader can see that shame is somehow related to both the political structure 
and to attaining virtue. Secondly, Aristotle notes precisely what type of pain shame deals with, 
namely, “evils that appear to pertain to disrepute.” This indicates that shame is felt when someone 
does not appear honorable. Importantly, this attaches shame to both virtue and the political, for 
Aristotle argues that “refined and active people choose honor, for this is pretty much the goal of 
political life” (1095b22). The feeling of shame is closely related to the ends that each political 
regime establishes as fundamental for its existence.22 Yet, the proper form of shame is further 
qualified, for it is not merely a result of public dishonor of anyone, or the hoi polloi, rather the 
honor one seeks, and consequently the group whose opinion of ill-repute will cause shame, 
“honor[] by the wise and by those who know them, and for virtue; it is clear then […] one might 
perhaps assume that this, rather than honor, is the end of the political life” (1095b29–32).  
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Aristotle recognizes that since shame is connected to reputation (1384a20), the individual who 
feels shame feels it in regards to the opinions of others, but one should not judge actions by just 
anyone’s opinions; rather, it should be “prudent people as truth-tellers, and such are those who are 
older and educated. And things more before men’s eyes and in the open […] for this reason men 
feel more shame before those who will always be present and those who pay heed to them” 
(1384a30–33). Since shame is derived from the external source of the opinions of others, and these 
opinions are codified in society through laws, the laws of society are also “before men’s eyes” and 
therefore “one needs to feel shame before those whom one holds in regard,” i.e., the laws (1384a20 
and 35). Further, as Aristotle states, “we assert that the excellent ruler is good and prudent” 
(1277a15). Shame is externally imposed, which is why it cannot be a virtue. Though it is externally 
imposed by law, the laws in a good regime, are like the spudious man and therefore control 
action.23 While the laws can impose shame, one must recognize that the laws and rulers are only 
images of virtue; as such, there may be flaws in the way that they teach virtue based upon the 
accuracy that they reflect true virtue. Additionally, perhaps Aristotle recognizes that such images 
will never show true virtue, and as such it is only a non-virtuous feeling, which as a semi-virtue  is 
the best that that these images can establish. 
Finally, it is important to understand that shame requires a form of like-mindedness that can 
arise either through the laws or through friendship. Aristotle notes that “like-mindedness seems to 
be friendship in a political sense” (1167b4) and further that “such like-mindedness is present 
among decent people […] [who aim at] things that are just and advantageous, and aim at these in 
common” (1167b5). Lawmakers are able to establish the standard because they “aim at [like-
mindedness] most of all and banish faction most of all for being hostile to it” (1155a25). Through 
creating a like-minded regime, the political system can establish the standard by which people may 
prospectively determine which actions are shameful. Through constant habituation in these 
actions, then, the good regime can guide those citizens who are capable to virtue. Thus, as Burnyeat 





1. For an introduction to the concept of shame in a variety of psychological and educational 
literature, see Kristjánsson 2014. 
2. Williams 1993. 
3. Burnyeat 1980; Curzer 2012; Cairns 1993; Kristjánsson 2014. 
4. Burnyeat 1980, 73. 
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5. Burnyeat 1980; Reeve 1992, 51–54. 
6. Emphasis added. 
7. Curzer 2002; Curzer 2012, 336–339. 
8. While Aristotle presents the connection between pain, pleasure, and virtue, we find that the 
spudious man (the standard of determining the virtuous mean (1107a2)) is not interested in 
pleasure at all; rather, “a person with practical judgment pursues the absence of pain, not 
what is pleasant” (1152b17). This indicates that the spudious man will avoid shame and, 
as this paper argues, use such an experience to teach others how to become prudent. 
9. It is not necessary for an individual to proceed through each of these steps of shame; rather, 
it is only necessary for a non-virtuous person to have prospective shame. If, in rare 
occurrences, someone is so well-versed in the laws and values of a society that he never 
commits a shameful act, but does so to prospectively prevent shame, that individual is 
closer to attaining virtue than the individual who commits shameful acts or omissions. 
10. As Cairns, the author of perhaps the most definitive work on Aidos, states, “Aidos is the 
older and more poetic term […]. Aischune, on the other hand, is the regular prosaic word 
of Aristotle’s own day” (1993, 415). In the Rhetoric, Aristotle primarily uses aischune, 
with only two uses of aidos. In the Nicomachean Ethics both terms are incorporated, but, 
as this paper argues, he does not use them interchangeably; rather, each term has a distinct 
meaning. 
11. Cairns also transliterates other key Greek words (arête, pathos, hexis); however, for my 
purposes here, they have been replaced with Sachs’s translation, so that the emphasis will 
be solely upon the Greek words for shame. 
12. Cairns 1993, 414. 
13. Konstan 2003, 1034. 
14. While Cairns notes the distinction in this passage between aischune as retrospective and 
aidos as prospective, he still seems to be unwilling to argue that Aristotle’s distinction in 
these terms is indicative of one being the proper form of the other (415). It would seem that 
Cairns’s conclusion, which is opposed to the one presented in this paper, arises from not 
examining Aristotle’s use, but in seeking to understand Aristotle’s usage in light of the 
historical development and usage of aidos and aischune. This is why his examination of 
Aristotle provides keen insights, yet he reaches a different conclusion because he appeals 
to the linguistic roots and poetic use of these terms, not to Aristotle’s specific use. 
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15. Emphasis added. 
16. This position is echoed by Cairns, who states, “Thus the aidos that is disparaged as 
appropriate for youth but not for adults is prospective” (1993, 416). 
17. It is true that Aristotle does not forbid the aged to feel aidos and it is possible that they may 
feel it. However, it seems that Aristotle would not condone the feeling of aidos among the 
aged, not because it is an inappropriate feeling in itself, but because it is inappropriate for 
that stage of life. Aidos is for the time of training and growth, but by the time one is older, 
one should have already received that appropriate training. However, because this training 
should have already taken place, the error of aischune is even more blatant, for it shows 
not only base action but also bad habituation and a continuation of living by feelings 
(1128b20). 
18. Sachs 2002, 79n97. 
19. Tessitore 1996, 15. 
20. Sachs 2002, xv. 
21. Sachs 2002, xvii. 
22. Bernard Williams’s work Shame and Necessity fully recognizes that the individual feeling 
of shame is reflective of “real social expectation” rooted in the community’s norms (84). 
23. See note 3 for an examination of the spudious man. 
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